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Abstract 
 
We address the impact of corruption in a developing economy in the context of an 
empirically relevant hold-up problem - when a foreign firm sinks an investment to 
provide infrastructure services. We focus on the structure of the economy’s 
bureaucracy, which can be centralized or decentralized, and characterize the 
‘corruptibility’ of bureaucrats in each case. Results are explained in terms of the non-
internalization, under decentralization, of the ‘bribe externality’ and the ‘price 
externality.’ In welfare terms, decentralization is favoured, relatively speaking, if the 
tax system is less inefficient, funding is less tight, bureaucrats are less venal, or 
compensation for expropriation is ungenerous. 
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Corruption is one of the most serious economic problems in developing countries.
It is concentrated in countries that are poorest and have the lowest levels of human
capital (Treisman, 2000) and can be substantial.1 It can be a tax on investment
(Mauro, 1995) and bribes may substitute for taxes, thus reducing public service
provision or resulting in further taxation, typically with a high excess burden
(Goulder et al., 1997). Corruption also provides incentives for bureaucrats and
politicians to bias resource allocation decisions to create opportunities for bribery
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), and it may be associated with expenditure of resources
to maintain secrecy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). More generally, corruption may
undermine respect for the law and may feed on itself (Bardhan, 1997). Econometric
evidence suggests corruption is costly for resource allocation (Svensson, 2005).
An extensive theoretical and empirical literature has developed on how the
eﬀects of corruption are related to whether the administrative framework is cen-
tralized or decentralized (see, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Besley and Coate, 1999;
Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Theoretical results are found to diﬀer according to what
form of decentralization is being examined (a federal system; interjurisdictional
competition; or uncoordinated rent-seeking) and which variables are under con-
sideration (revenue and expenditure, or only expenditure). Empirical ﬁndings are
1For example, according to Reinikka and Svensson (2004), only 18% of funds dispensed by
the central government in a public education program in Uganda actually reached schools. The
bulk of the remainder was captured by local oﬃcials and politicians.
1also mixed. For example, Treisman (2000) ﬁnds that decentralization is associated
with more corruption, while Fisman and Gatti (2002) ﬁnd the converse, but us-
ing a diﬀerent concept of decentralization (the sub-national share of government
spending, rather than federalism).
The conclusions of the literature on the eﬀects of corruption are contradictory
in part because the characteristics of corruption and the factors that inﬂuence it are
context-speciﬁc. In this paper we focus on the impact of corruption in a particular
situation that has been of considerable signiﬁcance to developing economies since
1990 - investment in infrastructure and public service provision by a foreign ﬁrm.2
Infrastructure investment typically involves a large sunk element; but it is hard
for governments to make credible commitments, and so investors are particularly
vulnerable to hold-up, leading to renegotiation (Guasch, Laﬀont and Straub, 2003;
Guasch, 2004).
We analyze the impact of corruption for a centralized and for a decentralized
bureaucracy. Our framework has two bureaucrats bargaining sequentially with an
investor on behalf of the government.3 Bureaucrat 1 negotiates a contract provi-
sionally specifying the amount the investor will be paid. Then, after the investment
is sunk, bureaucrat 2 can renegotiate terms, using the threat of expropriation. In
2The critical importance of the provision of infrastructure services for both growth and the
alleviation of poverty is emphasized by the World Bank (2004).
3In his study of bribery by ﬁrms in Uganda, Svensson (2003) ﬁnds that the amounts of bribes
paid are consistent with bargaining theory, the payments depending positively on ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and negatively on their alternative earnings.
2our benchmark case we assume bureaucrats are ‘scrupulous;’ that is, they eschew
bribery on principle. Their objective is simply to maximize domestic welfare.
Corruption is introduced by assuming that bureaucrats are instead willing to take
bribes. The investor may oﬀer a bribe to bureaucrat 1 to secure a higher price in
the provisional contract, and may oﬀer a bribe to bureaucrat 2 to avert expropri-
ation. However, even if a bureaucrat is corrupt, he or she may have some concern
for domestic welfare, perhaps for selﬁsh reasons relating to career prospects (see
Becker and Stigler, 1974), but possibly on ethical grounds. Consequently, when
oﬀered a bribe, even a corrupt bureaucrat may decline, instead behaving as if he
or she were scrupulous. We refer to this behavior as exercising the ‘honest option.’
We assume that exercise of the honest option is the backstop for any bargaining
over a bribe that takes place (this approach is also taken by Dixit, 2004, Ch. 2).
We characterize the willingness of a bureaucrat to take a bribe in terms of a
‘corruptibility’ parameter, the value of which depends on three factors: concern
for domestic welfare; the ineﬃciency of the domestic tax system; and the institu-
tional structure. (De)centralization plays a critical role in determining outcomes.
We deﬁne there to be ‘centralization’ if bureaucrats 1 and 2 collude to maximize
their joint payoﬀ. In contrast, in a ‘decentralized’ bureaucracy each bureaucrat
independently maximizes his or her own payoﬀ. Thus, with decentralization, one
bureaucrat does not internalize the other’s concern for the eﬀect of a higher price
3on domestic welfare (the ‘price externality’), and this raises corruptibility relative
to the centralized case. Whether bribery occurs also depends on the ‘private ben-
eﬁt’ of a price rise. This is the net beneﬁt, to the investor and the bureaucrat
concerned, of agreeing a higher price. The size of the bribe that bureaucrat 2 may
be able to negotiate depends on the level of the provisional price agreed by bureau-
crat 1 with the investor. With decentralization, bureaucrat 1 does not internalize
the eﬀect on the bribe that bureaucrat 2 is able to negotiate (the ‘bribe external-
i t y ’ ) ,a n dt h i sl o w e r st h ep r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt of a price rise relative to the centralized
case.
In a widely-cited analysis, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) develop a model in which,
in social welfare terms, a centralized bureaucracy always dominates a decentralized
one.4 However, consistent with the view that the impact of corruption is highly
context-speciﬁc, in our model of sunk cost and hold-up, neither centralized nor
decentralized bureaucracy dominates unambiguously.5 The diﬀerence between the
4In their model, when there are many potential projects and two licences are required for a
project to go ahead, the equilibrium supply of licences is greater when a single bureaucrat controls
the supply of both licences (centralization) than when a separate bureaucrat is in control of each
(decentralization). This is because the single bureaucrat internalizes the eﬀect of granting one
licence on the value of the other licence (see also Waller et al., 2002).
5In our analysis the investor incurs a sunk cost only once, and the size of the sunk cost is
predetermined. See Thomas and Worrall (1994) for an analysis of expropriation in a model
where the government explicitly trades oﬀ the short-term gain from expropriation against the
long-term cost that the country will be less attractive to investors in the future. Also, Choi
and Thum (2004) examine how repeated extortion may aﬀect the choice of technology over time.
The possibility of extortion causes entrepreneurs to adopt technologies with ineﬃciently low sunk
costs. In their model there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, and they interpret the mixed-strategy
equilibrium as representing the reported arbitrary behaviour of corrupt governments.
4two institutional arrangements is manifested in two ways.6 One is that, depending
on parameter values, either arrangement may lead to a higher price being paid for
the project output. The other is that, for some parameter values, a project that
would go ahead under one arrangement would not do so under the other.
Suppose that, under either arrangement, the project goes ahead. Then the
failure of bureaucrat 1 to internalize the bribe externality under decentralization,
in eﬀect colluding with the investor to hold back price against the interests of
bureaucrat 2, is beneﬁcial to the domestic economy. At the same time, the failure
of each bureaucrat to internalize the price externality under decentralization has
a positive eﬀect on price, and this is damaging to the domestic economy. The net
result of these two conﬂicting eﬀects is that either centralization or decentralization
may yield the higher domestic welfare. Yet, although, under our assumptions, the
project always goes ahead under centralization, failure to internalize the bribe
externality under decentralization can prevent bureaucrat 1 and the investor from
ﬁnding a mutually acceptable price, thereby preventing the project from starting.
Thus, non-internalization of the bribe externality can have a deleterious eﬀect.
M o r e o v e r ,c o m p a r i s o n sa r ec o m p l i c a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a ti ns o m ec a s e sp r i c ei ss e t
so high that the welfare impact of the project is negative.
6For an alternative approach that emphasizes other costs and beneﬁts of decentralization, see
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). In their model, decentralization of decision-making, for example
to the local government in the area where a project will operate, may increase accountability
and thus reduce corruption; but if vested interests dominate locally, the beneﬁts of the project
may be diverted from those with the greatest needs.
5In Section 2 we outline the model, and in Section 3 we derive solutions for
scrupulousness, and for centralized and decentralized corruption. Section 4 com-
pares the results in these cases, and Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains
proofs.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 The Project
In the 1990s there was a shift in developing countries toward the private provision of
infrastructure by foreign investors, and by 2001 infrastructure investment totalling
£755b had ﬂowed into developing and transition economies in nearly 2500 projects
(Harris, 2003; see also Guasch, 2004). In the light of this experience, we model a
project that requires a ﬁxed investment to be sunk by a foreign ﬁrm (the ‘investor’)
at time t =1and yields a service at time t =2 .7 Payment of the investor, which
is assumed to take place at t =2 , is made out of public sector funds.
Let K denote the investor’s sunk cost at t =1 ,a n dW its running cost at
t =2 .8 Let P denote the payment that the public sector actually makes to the
investor, and B the total payment of bribes by the investor to bureaucrats. The
7This is consistent with the output of the project having a large public good element (e.g., a
port or a road) or being a merit good for which a policy decision has been taken that distribution
will be free or at a nominal price (e.g., water).
8All measures of cost and beneﬁt for each agent are in present-value terms.
6investor’s net proﬁt Π if it sinks the capital and runs the project is
Π = P − K − W − B.( 1 )
Payment P has a cost (1 + θ)P to the domestic economy, where θ ≥ 0.T h e
parameter θ represents the excess burden of taxation, which can be substantial for
developing economies (World Bank, 1997). The funds available for a project will
be limited by its anticipated beneﬁts, the competing uses for public funds, and
the government’s overall ﬁnancial position. We model this by assuming there to
be an upper limit to the budget for any particular project, the maximum feasible
expenditure being F.T h u s , P ≤ F. H o w e v e r ,w ee x c l u d et h ec a s eo fs e v e r e
underfunding in which F is so small as to prevent the investor from recovering
costs; i.e., we assume
F ≥ K + W.( 2 )
Let U denote the utility of the project output to the domestic population and
let N denote the net eﬀect of the project on domestic welfare.9 Then
N = U − (1 + θ)P.( 3 )
9To measure domestic welfare, we assign a zero weight to the bribe received by a bureaucrat.
T h e r ea r es e v e r a lw a y st om o t i v a t et h i sa s s u m p t i o n . I tm a yb eav a l u ej u d g e m e n t ,o rr e ﬂect
the likelihood that the bureaucrat will save and spend the bribe abroad, yielding little domestic
beneﬁt. It may also indicate that the bureaucrat has expended resources in rent-seeking, up to
the value of the bribe.
7Let Uθ ≡ U/(1 + θ). From (1) and (3), a necessary condition for a project to
r a i s en e td o m e s t i cw e l f a r e ,a sw e l la sb e i n gp r o ﬁtable, is that
Uθ ≥ K + W. (4)
We assume throughout that (4) holds.10
The government and the investor sign a contract at the beginning of t =1
specifying that in return for sinking the investment and running the project the
investor will be paid amount p at t =2 . If the contract is honoured, P = p,s o
that Π = Πc ≡ p −B −K −W and N = Nc ≡ U −(1 + θ)p. If the project is not
undertaken, N = Π =0 .
At t =2the investment has been sunk, and the government can renege on
the contract, expropriating the asset. Thus, contracts are incomplete, with the
government having de facto residual control rights over the asset. If expropriation
occurs, we assume that it pays partial compensation C, as speciﬁed below, and
the state sector then operates the asset to produce the service, though ineﬃciently,
with running cost (1 + γ)W,w h e r eγ>0. The project then still yields utility
U, but, because revenue is raised through taxation, the domestic welfare cost of
10The surplus S from the project can be deﬁned as net domestic welfare plus the investor’s
proﬁt, gross of bribes: S = U − K − W − θP. For all P satisfying (4), the project generates
a positive surplus (S ≥ 0).There is a strictly positive monotonic relationship between domestic
welfare, from which we exclude any bribe income, and the total surplus, that is, net domestic
welfare plus the investor’s proﬁt, gross of the transfers to bureaucrats in the form of bribes.
Hence, statements in the text about the relative levels of domestic welfare also apply to the total
surplus.
8expropriation is (1 + θ)[C +( 1+γ)W]. The upper limit on the project’s budget
implies that
C +( 1+γ)W ≤ F.( 5 )
If, alternatively, the government uses the threat of expropriation to renegotiate
terms at t =2 , the amount actually paid, P, will exceed the contract price p.
If a formula for C were negotiated ex ante by the government and the investor
it would not be credible, because the government could expropriate but still refuse
to pay. However, the government may be concerned to maintain its international
reputation as a host for foreign investment, or it may fear that expropriation
without compensation would elicit international sanctions. We therefore assume
t h a t ,u pt ot h ep o i n ta tw h i c ht h ec o n s t r a i n t( 5 )b i n d s ,C is a proportion δ ∈ (0,1)
of the investor’s marginal forgone proﬁt p−W (after sinking K).11 From (5), this
implies δ(p − W)+( 1+γ)W ≤ F.W r i t i n g p = pC for the highest value of p
satisfying this inequality, we have
p
C =
1
δ
[F − (1 − δ + γ)W].( 6 )
For p<p C, dC/dp > 0; i.e., a higher contract price p is associated with a higher
11S i n c ew es h a l ld e t e r m i n ep as a function of K, C depends indirectly on K.
9cost to the treasury of expropriation. Compensation C is therefore given by
C = δ(p − W) if p ≤ p
C;( 7 )
C = F − (1 + γ)W if p>p
C.
I nt h ee v e n to fe x p r o p r i a t i o n ,t h er e s p e c t i v ev a l u e so fΠ and N are
Π
e = C − K;( 8 )
N
e = U − (1 + θ)[C +( 1+γ)W].
Since δ<1, (7) and (8) imply that the investor prefers the contract to be honoured,
rather than the project to be expropriated.
2.2 The Bureaucracy
We assume that government decisions are made by public sector bureaucrats. Bu-
reaucrat 1 deals with the investor at t =1 , bargaining over price p, while bu-
reaucrat 2 deals with the investor at t =2 , bargaining over price P and potential
expropriation. Bureaucrat i may be paid a bribe bi (i =1 ,2), where b1 + b2 = B.
We regard it as unrealistic to suppose that a bureaucrat in a developing country
would be able to use his or her personal wealth to bribe a foreign investor (corrup-
tion is often argued to stem from low salaries in the public sector; see Svensson,
102005). Thus, we assume that b1,b 2 ≥ 0.
As well as caring about bribe income, a bureaucrat may place a positive weight
on net domestic welfare N because of the feedback on career prospects. It is also
possible that, when making decisions, a bureaucrat takes into account the eﬀect on
N for ethical reasons. To allow for the potential role of these factors, we include
a non-negative weight α in the utility function ui of each bureaucrat i,w h i c hi s
assumed to be
ui = bi + αN, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, i =1 ,2.( 9 )
We consider three cases. In the ﬁrst, our benchmark case, each bureaucrat i is
‘scrupulous;’ i.e., on principle, i would never take a bribe (bi =0 ; i =1 ,2). Thus,
ui = αN in this case, so that i always maximizes N, irrespective of the value of α
and of the institutional structure.
In the other two cases each bureaucrat i does not rule out bribe-taking on
principle. We label the bureaucrats in these cases as ‘corrupt,’ though whether
i accepts a bribe depends on whether this yields a higher utility. If a corrupt
bureaucrat declines a particular bribe oﬀer, we say that he or she has exercised
the ‘honest’ option. We shall see that if bureaucrats are corrupt their behavior
will depend on whether the bureaucracy is ‘centralized’ or ‘decentralized.’ With
a centralized bureaucracy each bureaucrat i maximizes the joint utility function
u(u1,u 2), which is deﬁned below. With a decentralized bureaucracy each bureau-
11crat i simply maximizes ui (i =1 ,2).
We assume that when the investor and a corrupt bureaucrat negotiate over a
bribe, the backstop is the solution that would obtain if the bureaucrat exercised
the honest option. Bribery takes place if both the investor and bureaucrat i gain,
compared to the honest option. Note that if corrupt bureaucrats 1 and 2 both
choose to exercise the honest option, the resulting price P w i l lb et h es a m ea si n
the benchmark case of a scrupulous bureaucracy.
We assume that price p is made public knowledge at t =1and that price
P is made public knowledge at t =2 . If bureaucrat 2 were to agree with the
investor to set P above p, net domestic welfare would be negatively aﬀected, and
so bureaucrat 2 could only have agreed to this price rise in return for a (suﬃciently
large) bribe. In this situation, observers would be able to infer that a bribe was
being paid. We assume that suﬃciently strong sanctions can be imposed, such as a
credible threat of sacking, to deter such behavior.12 Thus, in the solution, p ≥ P.
Since a necessary condition for an investor to start a project is that, anticipating
any renegotiation that will occur, P ≥ K + W,w et h e r e f o r eh a v et h a t
p ≥ P ≥ K + W.( 1 0 )
12Thus, we do not assume veriﬁability of improper behaviour to be a precondition for imposing
punishment on a bureaucrat.
123 Bureaucratic Corruption and Welfare
We begin by examining the behavior of a scrupulous bureaucracy, and then con-
sider a corrupt one, ﬁrst with centralization, and then with decentralization.
3.1 A Scrupulous Bureaucracy
When bureaucrats eschew bribery on principle, each maximizes αN.C o n s i d e rﬁrst
t =2 . Here, acting on behalf of the government, bureaucrat 2 has control rights,
and so may exercise the option to expropriate. With expropriation, bureaucrat
2’s utility is αNe, while (disregarding K, as it is sunk) the investor’s payoﬀ is C.
Instead, however, bureaucrat 2 may use the threat of expropriation to get price
revised to P,b e l o wt h ep r i c ep agreed at t =1 . For the threat to be credible,
Ne must be at least as great as the value of N from honouring the contract,
U − (1 + θ)p; i.e., using (8),
p ≥
1 − δ + γ
1 − δ
W.( 1 1 )
With (10), (11) implies that
(1 − δ)K ≥ γW.( 1 2 )
(12) indicates that the sunk cost K is relatively large and/or the compensation
13parameter δ is relatively small, making the investor particularly vulnerable to hold
up. Equivalently, the value of γW, the additional cost of running the project, is
relatively low, making expropriation cheap for the bureaucracy. Combined with
(2), (12) implies that
F ≥ δK +( 1+γ)W.( 1 3 )
The reduction in price emerging from the renegotiation at t =2can be thought
of as a tax T, the investor receiving the (net-of-tax) price P,w h e r eP = p−T.T h e
respective gains for bureaucrat 1 and the investor are then α[U − (1 + θ)(p − T)]
and p − T − W. Given (4), these are non-negative.
Lemma 1 With Nash bargaining over T (= p−P), it is found that the constraint
P ≤ F does not bind, and that
T =( 1− δ)(p − W) −
γ
2
W. (14)
Proof : see appendix
This bargain yields positive gains because expropriation would result in in-
eﬃcient provision. T is increasing in contract price p, and decreasing in cost
parameters, γ and W, and compensation parameter δ.F r o m ( 1 1 ) a n d ( 1 4 ) ,
14T ≥ (1 − δ + γ/2)W>0.S i n c eP = p − T,
P =
³
1 − δ +
γ
2
´
W + δp.( 1 5 )
P depends on p here because, as a constituent of the compensation formula
(7), p enters the threat points in the bargain at t =2 . W en o t e da b o v et h a ti f
an increment were added to p above pC, compensation C would not change. Such
an increment would have no eﬀect on the threat points, and would not aﬀect the
price P paid to the investor; i.e., if p exceeded pC, the excess would be superﬂuous
and could be disregarded. Hence, the role of pC in (7) eﬀectively imposes an upper
bound on the price p agreed at t =1 :
p ≤ p
C.( 1 6 )
Given (10), we therefore have
p
C ≥ K + W.( 1 7 )
Lemma 1 also speciﬁes that the constraint P ≤ F does not bind. This, too,
is because of the indirect role played by potential compensation. The budgetary
limit places an upper bound on any compensation, keeping the threat point in
the bargain low for the ﬁrm and high for the bureaucracy. This, endogenously,
15constrains the Nash bargain solution such that P is strictly less than F.W ec a n
therefore disregard the constraint P ≤ F i nt h er e s to ft h i ss e c t i o n .
Anticipating renegotiation at t =2 ,t h ec o n t r a c ta tt =1will be determined by
bureaucrat 1 and the investor through Nash bargaining over price p.T h ep a y o ﬀs
in this bargain are α[U−(1+θ)P] for bureaucrat 1 and P −K−W for the investor.
After substituting from (15), the solution is found to be
p =
1
2δ
[K + Uθ +( 2 δ − γ − 1)W].( 1 8 )
Given (4), (18) is consistent with (11). Substituting (18) into (15), we obtain our
ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 With a scrupulous bureaucracy, P = P∗,w h e r e
P
∗ =( Uθ + K + W)/2. (19)
From (4) and (19), P∗ ≤ Uθ. Since expropriation does not occur in equilibrium,
P∗ is independent of compensation parameter δ;b u tP∗ is increasing in utility U
and cost parameters K and W, and is decreasing in the excess burden parameter
θ.F o rP = P∗, net domestic welfare N and proﬁt Π are each non-negative.
163.2 Bureaucratic Corruption
We now assume that bureaucrats are corrupt: they are willing in principle to
take bribes. If the bureaucracy is decentralized, each bureaucrat i maximizes
ui, disregarding any eﬀect on the other bureaucrat’s utility. If, however, it is
decentralized, we assume that each bureaucrat maximizes the utility function
u(u1,u 2)=b1+b2+µαN = b1+b2+µα[U−(1+θ)(p−T)],w h e r e1 ≤ µ ≤ 2.( 2 0 )
Here, if bureaucrat i exercises the honest option, bribe bi =0(i =1 ,2); while if
bureaucrat 2 is paid a bribe to prevent expropriation, tax T =0 .T h ec o e ﬃcient
µ is introduced because of the alternative interpretations of parameter α.I f α
relates to the eﬀect of N on a bureaucrat’s career prospects, we can add u1 and
u2, i.e., µ =2 . However, if α is an ethical concern for doing duty, there is no
direct personal payoﬀ, and it would be inappropriate to add u1 and u2;r a t h e r ,w e
represent this case by assuming that µ =1 .13 More generally, the combination of
these interpretations is captured by the assumption that 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2.
We now deﬁne some terms. The ﬁrst is the ‘corruptibility’ of a bureaucrat: the
value he or she puts on receiving £1 as a bribe, rather than having the £1 to go
to the treasury. In a centralized bureaucracy, bureaucrat 2 places a value of unity
13It is also possible that the bureaucrat will enjoy a direct personal satisfaction from N.T h i s
would be equivalent, in the model, to a career beneﬁt.
17on £1 of bribe, and, from (3) and (20), a value of −µα(1 + θ) o na£ 1c u ti nP.
Thus, with a centralized bureaucracy, the corruptibility of bureaucrat 2 is
κ
c
2 =1− µα(1 + θ).( 2 1 )
With decentralization, although bureaucrat 2 puts a value of unity on any £1 of
bribe he or she receives - as when the bureaucracy is centralized - he or she puts
a value of only α(1 + θ) on the receipt of £1 by the treasury. The corruptibility
κd
2 of bureaucrat 2 is therefore
κ
d
2 =1− α(1 + θ).( 2 2 )
The fact that bureaucrat 2 (or 1) is corrupt does not necessarily mean that
he or she would accept a bribe oﬀer. Corruptibility must be positive for a bribe
to be taken. Bureaucrat 2’s corruptibility depends on welfare weight α,a n do n
the ineﬃciency θ of the tax system; and, with centralization, it also depends on
parameter µ.T h e d i ﬀerence between (21) and (22) indicates that corruptibility
depends on the institutional structure.
We also deﬁn et h e‘ p r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt,’ to the investor plus bureaucrat 1, from a
£1 increment to contract price p. For a centralized bureaucracy this is denoted
by β
c
1. Consider, however, a £1 increment that keeps p no greater than pC.T h i s
18has an eﬀect dP/dp on the price P paid at t =2 . For every £1 increment to P,
the investor gains unity, but the bureaucracy loses µα(1 +θ). But any loss to the
investor through a resulting increase in b2 is exactly oﬀset by the corresponding
gain to the bureaucracy. Hence,
β
c
1 =[ 1 − µα(1 + θ)]
dP
dp
for p ≤ p
C;( 2 3 )
β
c
1 =0 for p>p
C.
For a decentralized bureaucracy, we similarly have that, for p ≤ pC,i fp is
set £1 higher at t =1 ,t h e r ei sa ne ﬀect dP/dp on the price P paid at t =2 .
For every £1 increment to P the investor again gains unity, but now bureaucrat
1l o s e sα(1 + θ). Also, the bribe the investor pays to bureaucrat 2 will rise by
db2/dp, which is a cost to the investor, but, with decentralization, is disregarded
by bureaucrat 1. The private beneﬁt β
d
1 f r o mt h er i s ei np is therefore
β
d
1 =[ 1 − α(1 + θ)]
dP
dp
−
db2
dp
for p ≤ p
C;( 2 4 )
β
d
1 =0 for p>p
C.
There are two signiﬁcant diﬀerences between centralized and decentralized bu-
reaucracy. First, if µ>1, when, with decentralization, bureaucrat 2 makes de-
cisions in terms of κd
2 rather than κc
2, he or she is putting a smaller weight on
19treasury receipts, so that corruptibility is higher. Thus, parallel to the Shleifer-
Vishny (1993) analysis, decentralization has a negative eﬀect on domestic welfare,
relative to centralization. The second diﬀerence, however, relates to the private
beneﬁtb e i n gβ
d
1 rather than β
c
1. When bureaucrat 1 bargains with the investor
under decentralization, he or she disregards the eﬀe c tt h a to fah i g h e rp r i c ep on
any bribe income b2 of bureaucrat 2. In terms the impact on of domestic welfare,
this factor favours decentralization.
At t =2bureaucrat 2 and the investor negotiate on the basis of price p agreed
by bureaucrat 1 and the investor at t =1 .S u p p o s eﬁrst that corruptibility κc
2 or
κd
2, as appropriate, is positive. If bureaucrat 2 were to exercise the honest op-
tion, the investor would pay tax T to the treasury, as shown by (14). However,
since corruptibility is positive, bureaucrat 2 would not exercise the honest option,
preferring instead to pocket this payment, i.e., to take it as a bribe. Given this
possibility, bureaucrat 2 would not accept a bribe lower than the right-hand side of
(14). Conversely, since expropriation would reduce N and yield no bribe, it would
not be credible for bureaucrat 2 to threaten to expropriate if a bribe higher than
this were not paid. Hence the bribe in this case equals T in (14), which we have
seen is positive:
b2 =( 1− δ)(p − W) −
γ
2
W.( 2 5 )
However, if corruptibility (κc
2 or κd
2 as appropriate) is non-positive, bureaucrat
202 will accept the payment by the investor as a tax accruing to the treasury, rather
than as a bribe.
Lemma 2 With a corrupt bureaucracy, the investor pays the amount (1 − δ)(p −
W) −
γ
2W at t =2 . With a centralized bureaucracy, if κc
2 > 0 this amount is
taken as a bribe, while if κc
2 ≤ 0 it is paid to the treasury as a tax. The same
considerations apply with a decentralized bureaucracy, but with κd
2 replacing κc
2.
T oe x a m i n ew h a th a p p e n sa tt =1 , we consider centralization and decentral-
ization separately.
3.2.1 Centralized Corruption: t =1
Suppose ﬁrst that κc
2 > 0. Then bribery occurs at t =2and price is not rene-
gotiated, i.e., P = p. Consider the honest option at t =1 .T h i s b a c k s t o p f o r
any negotiation over a bribe b1 is determined in the knowledge that there will be
bribery at t =2 .N o t eﬁrst that, if, exercising this honest option, p were set equal
to pC, then investor would make a positive proﬁt Π, and the bureaucracy would get
a positive utility u(u1,u 2).14 Thus, for the honest option at t =1 , pC is a feasible
outcome. Now consider the option of bribery at t =1 . Since a unit price rise at
14In the solution for a scrupulous bureaucracy the investor receives price P∗ and makes a
positive proﬁt. Holding price at P∗, if we replace the tax T with the bribe b2,p r o ﬁt is unchanged.
But, for any p<p C,f r o m( 2 5 ) ,a ni n c r e m e n tt op would cause an increase in P greater than
that in b2, and so the investor would gain. (This statement is true provided p does not rise to
a level at which the bureaucracy would expropriate at t =2 . But the gain to the bureaucracy
from expropriation is µα{U −(1 +θ)[C +( 1+γ)W]}−µα[U −(1+θ)P] −b2 ≡ ∆. Using (25),
P = p, and the fact that κc
2 > 0, it is found that d∆/dp < 0. Thus, raising p will not make
expropriation advantageous to the bureaucracy.) Hence Π(pC) > 0 with the bribe give by (25).
21t =1yields private beneﬁt β
c
1, which has the same sign as corruptibility κc
2(> 0),
there is an incentive to raise p by bribery as far as possible. We conclude that p is
sure to be raised to pC. Exercise of the honest option may result in p = pC;b u t ,
if it does not, p will be raised to pC through bribery.
Lemma 3 If κc
2 > 0 a centralized corrupt bureaucracy will set p = pC.
Proof: see appendix.
When, instead, κc
2 ≤ 0, bureaucrat 2 will take the honest option, tax T being
paid as speciﬁed in (14). If bureaucrat 1 were also to take the honest option,
the solution would be the same as if the bureaucracy were scrupulous. Consider,
however, the possibility of bribery at t =1 .F r o m( 2 1 )a n d( 2 3 ) ,s i n c eκc
2 ≤ 0,a
unit price rise at t =1would have a negative private beneﬁt β
c
1. Hence, at t =1
a price rise through bribery would not be chosen; and whereas bribery could in
principle occur to lower price, b2 would then have to be negative, which we rule
out. Thus, there is no deviation from the honest option.
Lemma 4 With a centralized corrupt bureaucracy, and κc
2 ≤ 0, the honest option
is taken at t =1 .
Proof: see appendix.
Our second proposition then follows from Lemmas 2-4.
Substituting from (25) into (24), and then setting p = pC,w eo b t a i nδu = δ{µα{U − (1 +
θ)W] − γW/2} +[ 1− δ − µα(1 + θ)][F − (1 + γ)W]. Using (4), (12), and (14), it is found that
that u(pC) > 0.
22Proposition 2 With a centralized corrupt bureaucracy, if κc
2 > 0 then P = pC,
with bribery possibly occurring at t =1 , and certainly occurring at t =2 ;b u ti f
κc
2 ≤ 0 then P = P∗, and there is no bribery.
Thus, the price P paid by the investor under a centralized bureaucracy depends
on whether the bureaucracy prefers to receive any £1 as a bribe, rather than having
the money go to the treasury. If it prefers the bribe, price will reach its maximum
feasible level; but if it (weakly) prefers the money to go to the treasury, price will
be the same as when the bureaucracy is scrupulous.
Focusing on the case of positive corruptibility κc
2, we now consider the sign of
N for P = pC. From (3) and (6),
N(p
C)=( 1+θ){Uθ − [F − (1 − δ + γ)W]/δ}, (26)
and so we have the following lemma.
Lemma 5 With a centralized bureaucracy, if κc
2 > 0,
N R 0 as F Q δUθ +( 1− δ + γ)W. (27)
With positive corruptibility, a centralized bureaucracy drives price P up to the
highest feasible level, given F. Price may exceed Uθ, in which case N<0.T h u s ,
unless the available ﬁnance F is suﬃciently tight, a centralized bureaucracy can
23result in a price for which the net impact of the project is detrimental to domestic
welfare.
3.2.2 Decentralized Corruption: t =1
Suppose ﬁrst that κd
2 > 0, so that bribery will occur at t =2 .T h e nP = p and,
from (25), db2/dp =1− δ. Hence, from (24), the private beneﬁtf r o mt h ep r i c e
rise is
β
d
1 =1− α(1 + θ) − (1 − δ)=δ − α(1 + θ) for p ≤ p
C.( 2 8 )
Comparison of (28) with (23) (with dP/dp =1 )c a p t u r e st h et w oe ﬀects of de-
centralization, relative to centralization, mentioned above. First, if µ>1,t h e
term 1 − α(1 + θ) in (28) exceeds the corresponding term 1 − µα(1 + θ) in (23):
with decentralization, bureaucrat 1 does not internalize bureaucrat 2’s dislike of a
price rise (the ‘price externality’), so the incentive to raise p is greater than under
centralization. Second, the investor and bureaucrat 1 do not internalize the eﬀect
1 − δ on bureaucrat 2’s bribe income (the ‘bribe externality’), and this reduces
the incentive to raise p relative to that under centralization. Thus, with decentral-
ization, the incentive to raise p at t =1 , compared to that under centralization,
depends on the relative sizes of these conﬂicting eﬀects.
Consider the honest option. This yields the investor proﬁt Π(p)=p − K −
W − b2, i.e., using (25), Π(p)=δp− K − (δ − γ/2)W; and bureaucrat 1’s utility
24is u1(p)=αN(p). A Nash bargain would then yield the price p = p0,w h e r e
p
0 =
1
2
·
Uθ +
2δ − γ
2δ
W +
1
δ
K
¸
.( 2 9 )
However, this bargain is not valid for all parameter values (proﬁto ru t i l i t ym a y
b en e g a t i v e ) ,a n dw em u s tt a k ei n t oa c c o u n tt h ec o n s t r a i n tp ≤ pC.15 These
considerations lead to the next lemma. Here, p0 denotes the value of p at which,
for κd
2 > 0 (so that b2 is given by (25)), Π(p)=0 , i.e.,
p0 =[ K +( δ − γ/2)W]/δ.( 3 0 )
Lemma 6 For a decentralized corrupt bureaucracy with κd
2 > 0, the honest option
for bureaucrat 1 is the following. (i) If Uθ ≤ p0, the project is not begun. (ii) If
Uθ >p 0,t h e n( a )i fN(pC) < 0,t h e np = p0;( b )i fN(pC) ≥ 0 and pC >p 0,t h e n
p =m i n ( p0,p C);( c )i fN(pC) ≥ 0 and pC ≤ p0, the project is not begun.
Proof : see appendix.
Part (i) of the lemma describes a situation in which Uθ ≤ p0, i.e., relative to
the utility of the project, costs are so great that the investor and bureaucrat 1 do
not reach an agreement on price p.P a r t( i i )r e l a t e st ow h e nUθ >p 0, i.e., costs are
not prohibitively great. Three cases can then be distinguished,d e p e n d i n go nt h e
15As in the corresponding analysis for centralized bureaucracy, for the range of parameter
values for which the bargain is valid, bureaucrat 1 will never choose to expropriate.
25value of pC. To relate the results more easily to those for centralization, the lemma
is written in terms of the inequality N(pC) < (≥)0 , rather then the equivalent
inequality pC > (≤) Uθ.I n c a s e ( a ) , pC >U θ (so that N(pC) < 0), the upper
bound on p being too high to have an eﬀect on the bargain between the investor
and bureaucrat 1. Hence, p = p0. In cases (b) and (c), pC ≤ Uθ (thus, N(pC) ≥ 0),
the constraint p ≤ pC potentially playing a role. In case (c) the constraint is so
tight that it prevents the investor from making a positive proﬁt, while (b) is an
intermediate case, in which the constraint does not preclude an agreement being
reached, and so p =m i n ( p0,p C).
Still assuming that κd
2 > 0,w en o wi n t r o d u c et h ep o s s i b i l i t yt h a tt h ei n v e s t o r
will bribe bureaucrat 1. Suppose ﬁrst that β
d
1 ≥ 0. This implies that, in the
absence of a bribe at t =1 , Π(p) increases more quickly in p than u1(p) decreases
in p. Hence there is a potential for raising p to pC through bribery. For this case,
we must examine the possibility of bribery for each possible outcome of the honest
option as described in the various parts of Lemma 6.
In part (i) we have no agreement under the honest option. However, since
β
d
1 ≥ 0,i fΠ(pC)+u1(pC) ≥ 0 a bribe will be agreed to start the project with
p = pC.B u t i f Π(pC)+u1(pC) < 0 t h ep r o j e c tw i l ln o ts t a r t . I np a r t( i i a ) ,t h e
honest option results in p = p0, at which both players achieve positive payoﬀs.
Since β
d
1 ≥ 0, p will be raised to pC by bribery, with both players thereby raising
26their payoﬀs. In part (iib) the honest option yields p =m i n ( p0,p C).B yt h es a m e
argument as for part (iia), if p0 <p C will be raised to pC by bribery, but otherwise
it will left unchanged at pC. In part (iic) the honest option yields no agreement
because the constraint p ≤ pC is too tight to allow the investor to gain a positive
proﬁt. Since we rule out negative bribes, there is no scope for bribery to change
this outcome.
If β
d
1 < 0, there is no scope for bribery to raise p, while a reduction of p through
an e g a t i v eb r i b eb1 < 0 is ruled out by assumption. The honest option is therefore
taken.
We therefore obtain the following lemma.16
Lemma 7 Consider a corrupt decentralized bureaucracy, and suppose corruptibil-
ity κd
2 > 0.C o n s i d e r t =1 .( i ) I f p r i v a t e b e n e ﬁt β
d
1 ≥ 0,t h e np = pC (possi-
bly through bribery) unless either (a) Uθ ≤ p0 and Π(pC)+u1(pC) < 0,o r( b )
Uθ >p 0 ≥ pC and N(pC) ≥ 0. In cases (a) and (b) the project is not started. (ii)
If private beneﬁt β
d
1 < 0, the honest option obtains as speciﬁed in Lemma 6.
Finally, suppose κd
2 ≤ 0. Then bureaucrat 2 will exercise the honest option,
bargaining to maximize N.T h u s ,i n ( 2 4 ) db2/dp =0 . If bureaucrat 1 takes the
honest option, we have the same solution as with a scrupulous bureaucracy; that
is, P = P∗. But consider the possibility of bribery at t =1 .F r o m( 1 5 ) ,dP/dp = δ,
16Proofs of the existence, or otherwise, of a bribe satisfying both, bureaucrat 1 and the investor
are similar to those in Lemmas 3 and 4.
27and so, from (24), signβ
d
1 = sign[1 − α(1 + θ)] = signκd
2 ≤ 0. Negativity of the
private beneﬁt β
d
1 rules out the possibility of raising p by a positive bribe b1.T h e
honest option is therefore exercised at t =1 . Thus, our last lemma closely parallels
Lemma 4.
Lemma 8 With a decentralized corrupt bureaucracy, if corruptibility κd
2 ≤ 0,t h e
honest option is taken at t =1 .
Taking into account that κd
2 >β
d
1, these results can be summarized as in our
third proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider a corrupt decentralized bureaucracy. (i) If κd
2 ≤ 0,t h e r e
is no bribery, and P = P∗. (ii) If κd
2 > 0 >β
d
1, the honest option is taken at t =1 ,
but there is bribery at t =2 , with results as speciﬁed in Lemmas 6 and 7. (iii) If
κd
2 >β
d
1 ≥ 0,t h e r em a yb eb r i b e r ya tt =1 , and there will be bribery at t =2 ;
either P = pC or the project is not started (see Lemma 7).
4 Types of Bureaucracy and Social Welfare
By examining what happens to the price P, we can rank institutional arrange-
ments with respect to net domestic welfare N = U − (1 + θ)P.W e b e g i n b y
comparing centralized corruption with decentralized corruption, and then bring
scrupulousness into the comparison.
28Suppose ﬁrst that the bureaucrats’ concern for welfare is entirely ethical: µ =1 .
Then κc
2 = κd
2, and we denote both of these corruptibility parameters by κ2.F o r
κ2 ≤ 0, centralized and decentralized corruption each give the same result as
a scrupulous bureaucracy (P = P∗), so we focus on what happens when κ2 >
0. In this case centralized corruption always results in the project going ahead
with p = pC, though N(pC) may take either sign. With this in mind, we can
make the comparison by reference to Table 1, which summarizes the results for
decentralization. The ﬁnal column of the table shows whether centralization, Cent,
or decentralization, Dec, is superior with respect to N. For the case in which
decentralization is is weakly superior, the Dec is written in parentheses.
[Table 1]
For a non-negative private beneﬁt β
1
d from a price rise under decentralization
there are two rows in the table in which decentralization results in no project. In
one of these rows Uθ >p 0 ≥ pC and N(pC) ≥ 0, in which case centralization is
superior. In the other, however, it occurs when Uθ ≤ p0 (i.e., when N(p0) ≤ 0),
and αΠ(pC)+N(pC) < 0.S i n c eΠ(pC) ≥ 0, it follows that N(pC) < 0 in this case.
Thus, in this second case, centralized corruption results in a negative value of N,
while decentralized corruption is preferable because it results in the project not
being adopted.
For β
1
d < 0, each row of the table yields a diﬀerent result from p = pC.I nt h e
29ﬁrst of these rows, Uθ ≤ p0,w h i c h ,w i t h( 2 6 ) ,g i v e s
N(p
C) ≤
1+θ
δ
³
K + W − F +
γ
2
W
´
.( 3 1 )
If K +W −F +
γ
2W<0, N(pC) < 0, in which case, since decentralization results
in no project, it is superior. Since K + W − F ≤ 0, this result is favoured by a
large state sector ineﬃciency parameter γ and by a large excess of ﬁnance F over
production costs K + W.
I nt h el a s tt h r e er o w so ft h et a b l eβ
1
d < 0 and Uθ >p 0.I n t h e ﬁrst of these
rows, N(pC) < 0, and price is p0. Since this row relates to the case in which
Uθ <p C,w eh a v et h a tp0 <p C,a n ds oN(p0) >N (pC). Hence, decentralization
is superior to centralization in this case. The following row, with N(pC) ≥ 0 and
p0 <p C,g i v e sP =m i n ( pC,p 0), and so decentralization is weakly superior. In the
last row, however, with N(pC) ≥ 0 and p0 ≥ pC, the project does not start under
decentralization and so, since N(pC) ≥ 0, centralization is superior.
Combining these conclusions, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Consider a corrupt bureaucracy with µ =1and κ2 > 0.C e n t r a l -
ization is superior to decentralization if and only if Uθ >p 0 ≥ pC and N(pC) ≥ 0.
Decentralization is weakly superior to centralization if N(pC) < 0.
For κ2 > 0, centralization always pushes price to the maximum level pC.
30Nonetheless, if centralization yields a non-negative level of welfare N(pC),w h e r e a s
under decentralization the investor and bureaucrat 1 do not start the project, cen-
tralization is preferable. This can happen because, under decentralization, the
investor and bureaucrat do not internalize the bribe externality - the beneﬁtt o
bureaucrat 2 of the bribe he or she would receive if the project were run. If
N(pC) < 0, the project yielding negative net welfare under centralization, decen-
tralization can be superior either because it results in a lower price being paid to
the investor, or because it results in the project not being started. The underlying
rationale in these cases is again the non-internalization of the bribe externality.
It may be assumed, however, that the bureaucrats’ concern for welfare is not
entirely ethical (µ>1), in which case the results above must be amended. Cor-
ruptibility κc
2 under centralization is then less than we have assumed so far in
this section, while corruptibility κd
2 under decentralization is unaﬀected. Conse-
quently, the range of parameter values for which P = P∗ under centralization is
extended, whereas the results under decentralization remain the same as in Table
1. Speciﬁcally, we obtain the following result.17
Proposition 5 With a corrupt bureaucracy, a suﬃcient condition for centraliza-
17To obtain this proposition, we suppose that κd
2 =1− α(1 + θ) > 0, so that decentralization
does not result in P = P∗,a n dw er a i s eµ to the level at which κc
2 =1− µα(1 + θ) ≤ 0.
31tion to be superior to decentralization is that
1 >α (1 + θ) ≥ 1/µ. (32)
A higher value of µ, ethics being less important, favours centralization because
it is associated with a larger range of α(1 + θ)-values for which corruptibility is
negative under centralization. If µ>1, higher values of the bureaucrat’s care
α for domestic welfare and of the ineﬃciency θ of the tax system tend to favour
centralization because they expand further the range of values for which corrupt-
ibility is negative under centralization than they do under decentralization. A high
compensation parameter δ tends to favour centralization because it is associated,
under decentralization, with a relatively high private beneﬁtf r o mr a i s i n gp.
As a corollary of this analysis, we obtain the ranking of centralized and decen-
tralized corruption relative to scrupulousness.18
Corollary 1 If µα(1 + θ) > 1 centralized corruption yields the same result as
scrupulousness; if α(1 + θ) > 1 decentralized corruption yields the same result as
scrupulousness. In all other cases scrupulousness is superior to corruption.
Proof: see appendix.
18If bureaucrats place no weight on net domestic welfare (α =0 ) then both centralized and
decentralized corruption result in price P being set at its maximum feasible level pC. Hence,
scrupulousness is preferable for all parameter values.
32For both centralization and decentralization, a range of parameter values ex-
ists, as speciﬁed in the corollary, in which bureaucrats exercise the honest option,
yielding the same result as with scrupulousness. But for all other parameter values
corruption either results in a higher price than under scrupulousness, or it results
in the project not starting.
5 Conclusions
Literature on the impact of corruption has produced relatively few general proposi-
tions or empirical ﬁndings. This seems to be because the characteristics of corrup-
tion are context speciﬁc. In this paper we have addressed the impact of corruption
in a particular, empirically relevant, context for many developing economies: the
provision, through direct foreign investment, of infrastructure services. We focus
on the role of the structure of the economy’s bureaucracy, which can be centralized
or decentralized.
Our framework applies when foreign ﬁrms undertake investments with a sig-
niﬁcant sunk cost element, therefore being vulnerable to hold-up. Our analysis is
formulated our in terms of the ‘corruptibility’ of bureaucrats under each institu-
tional structure, using as a benchmark the case of a ‘scrupulous’ bureaucracy. We
explain the diﬀerences between the results of centralization and decentralization in
terms of the non-internalization, in the latter case, of two externalities - the ‘bribe
33externality’ and of the ‘price externality.’ For Shleifer and Vishny (1993), central-
ized corruption is always preferable to decentralized corruption. In our framework,
however, either a decentralized bureaucracy or a centralized one can be advanta-
geous, depending on parameter values. These two arrangements may diﬀer either
in terms of the price that the investor is paid or in terms of whether an agreement
is reached to start the project. We ﬁnd that, in welfare terms, decentralization is
favoured, relative to centralization, if, for example, the tax system is less ineﬃ-
cient, bureaucrats are less venal or the compensation for expropriation is relatively
ungenerous. Also, if the state is willing to allocate a relatively large amount of
funds to the project, this tends to favour decentralization.
Our analysis is not consistent with the ‘grease hypothesis,’ which postulates
that bribery can partially overcome ineﬃciencies created by government inter-
vention in market processes (Leﬀ, 1964, Lui, 1985). We ﬁnd that a scrupulous
bureaucracy dominates both types of corruption. Since the motivation for a bribe
is either to raise the price paid by the public treasury or to divert the proceeds
from hold-up away from the public treasury into the pockets of the bureaucracy,
bribery is always damaging to domestic welfare.
34Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 If P ≤ F is non-binding, T =a r g m a x z{α[U − (1 + θ)(p − z) −
Ne]}(p − z − W − C). Using (7) and (8), we obtain (14). Using P = p − T, P
would exceed F if
p>
1
δ
h
F −
³
1 − δ +
γ
2
´
W
i
= p
C +
γ
2δ
W.( a 1 )
However, since p ≤ pC, (a1) never holds; i.e., the constraint P ≤ F on the Nash
bargain at t =2does not bind.
Lemma 3 The reasoning is outlined in the text; here we conﬁrm that with
bribery at t =1 , p = pC.S u p p o s et h a ta tt =1t h ei n v e s t o rp a y sa£ 1b r i b ef o r
a positive increment ξ to p. The bureaucracy gains 1 directly, but the increment
to p cuts u(u1,u 2) by µα(1 + θ)ξ;a n d ,f r o m( 2 5 ) ,b2 rises by (1 − δ)ξ.T h e
investor pays the £1 bribe, but gains the price rise ξ,w h i l ei t sp a y m e n tb2 rises by
(1−δ)ξ.N e tb e n e ﬁts are ∆B =1−µα(1+θ)ξ +(1−δ)ξ for the bureaucracy and
∆I = −1+ξ − (1 − δ)ξ = δξ − 1 for the investor. Both ∆B > 0 and ∆I > 0 if
δ>1/ξ > µα(1 + θ) − 1+δ.( a 2 )
In the lemma, κc
2 =1− µα(1 + θ) > 0. Hence, a positive ξ can satisfy (a2), each
player’s gain being greater the more p is raised: p(= P) will be raised to pC.
Lemma 4 Given that the honest option will be taken at t =2 ,c o n s i d e rt =
1 Suppose the investor pays a £1 bribe for a positive increment ξ to p.T h e
bureaucracy gains 1 directly, but the increment to p reduces u(u1,u 2) by µα(1+θ)ξ.
From (14), T rises by (1−δ)ξ, adding µα(1+θ)(1−δ)ξ to u(u1,u 2). The net beneﬁt
35to the bureaucracy of the £1 of bribe is ∆B =1−µα(1+θ)δξ. The investor loses
£1 of bribe, but gains the increment ξ to P. It also loses the increment (1 − δ)ξ
to tax T. Its net beneﬁtp e r£ 1o fb r i b ei st h e r e f o r e∆I = δξ − 1.B o t h∆B > 0
and ∆I > 0 if
δ>1/ξ > µα(1 + θ)δ.( a 3 )
With κc
2 ≤ 0,( a 3 )c a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed by b2 ≥ 0;a n db2 < 0 is excluded by
assumption. Following similar reasoning for a bribe to cut price, this too would
only work if b2 < 0.
Lemma 6 From the text, Π(p)=δp − K − (δ − γ/2)W and u1(p)=αN(p).
Hence, dΠ(p)/dp > 0; du1(p)/dp < 0; Π(0) = −K − W − b2 < 0,a n du1(0) > 0.
Also, Π(p)=0at p =[ K +( δ −γ/2)W]/δ ≡ p0,a n du1(p)=0at p = Uθ. Hence,
if constraint p ≤ pC is ignored, the Nash bargain is valid (p = p0)f o rUθ >p 0.N o w
impose p ≤ pC.I f pC >U θ, i.e., if N(pC) < 0, the constraint does not bind. If
pC ≤ Uθ, i.e., if N(pC) ≥ 0, there are two cases. If pC >p 0,t h e np ≤ pC may bind,
so that p =m i n ( p0,p C);b u ti fpC ≤ p0, the price constraint prevents agreement.
Corollary 1 Since p ≤ pC,a n dP∗ = p − T,w h e r eT>0, it follows that
P∗ <p C. The corollary is therefore follows from our propositions, except in one
case - when decentralized bureaucracy leads to P = p0. But, using (19), (29), and
(12), it is found that p0 >P ∗,a n ds oN is higher under scrupulousness.
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